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Abstract
The current study explored the influence of trust
and distrust behaviors on affect over time. We
examined the differences in affect when participants
(N=97) were paired with a human or a robot while
playing a modified version of the investor game.
Results indicated that there were no differences in
affect between partner types when the partner
performed a trustful behavior. When the partner
performed a distrustful behavior, positive affect was
higher for human partners than for robot partners.
When robot partners performed a distrustful
behavior, negative affect had a steeper incline
compared to human partners. These findings suggest
that people are more sensitive to distrust behaviors
that are performed by a robot over a human.

1. Introduction
Automation is becoming ever more intertwined
with our day-to-day experiences. Engineers,
researchers, roboticists, and designers are working
together to examine how to improve human
experiences with automation. The goals of these
interactions vary depending on the context. For
example, when interacting with self-driving cars,
design goals are user safety and preserving calibrated
user trust in the car’s automation. In comparison,
when interacting with a social robot, the design goals
may be user entertainment and efficient information
sharing between the user and the robot. Researchers
are interested in the factors that influence these
human-automation (H-A) interactions. The more
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industry knows about factors that influence these
interactions, the more they can improve automation
so that it is operating at an optimal level for each
user and context.
One of these factors that influence humanautomation interaction is trust. Users are less likely to
rely on automated systems and robots that they do not
trust [1]. Additionally, research has shown that when
teammates trust a robot, performance on tasks is better
compared to when teammates distrust robots [2; 3].
Another factor that has influenced humanautomation interactions is affect (e.g., [4]). Similar to
when people interact with one another, the emotions
experienced while engaging with automation and robots
can influence that interaction in both positive and
negative ways. Further, people may experience different
affective responses depending on whether they trust or
distrust an automated referent [1]. In this paper, we
discuss the roles of trust and affect in human-human (HH) versus H-A interactions. Our main goal is to examine
the effect of trust manipulations on affect.

1.1. Trust
Trust is defined as a willingness to be
vulnerable to another with the expectation of a
positive outcome [3]. A trustor is the person
engaging in trusting intentions or actions, and a
trustee is the referent or object of trust. Mayer and
colleagues [5] proposed a model of the trust process
that explicates trust from its antecedents, namely
the trustor’s propensity to trust (i.e., a general
tendency to trust others) and the trustor’s perceived
trustworthiness of the trustee (i.e., characteristics of
trustees that influence how trustworthy they appear
to the trustor). These antecedents influence the
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trustor’s willingness to be vulnerable (i.e., trust
intention), which leads to reliance behaviors (i.e.,
the behavioral outcomes attributed to a trust
intention). There is a considerable amount of
empirical research that has examined the trust
process in H-H interactions. However, there is
comparatively less research that has examined
differences in the trust process in H-H versus H-A
interactions.
Although people apply social norms to humanautomation interactions (e.g., [6]), there may be
differences between how humans trust one another
and how humans trust automation. Madhaven and
Weigmann [7] described the similarities and
differences in these two types of interactions.
People commit the fundamental attribution error
when engaging with both humans and automation.
That is, whether the referent is a person or an
automated system, people attribute undesirable
behaviors to the referent’s personality (or the entire
system in the case of automation) instead of
situational circumstances. However, differences
between H-H and H-A interactions reside in the
trust process itself, mainly trust building and
decaying over time. In interpersonal interactions,
people are more cautious in the beginning of a
relationship: it takes longer to build a relationship
and to establish trust between two people. In H-A
interactions, there is an automation bias (e.g., [8])
where humans trust automation more than humans
in initial interactions [7]. This is also similar to a
bias known as perfect automation schema [9].
Perfect automation schema is the belief that
automated systems perform without errors and have
better, more reliable performance than humans.
Thus, people are more forgiving of humans when
they make a mistake or perform contrary to their
expectations. It is easier for people to rationalize
humans’ actions. In comparison, if a system or robot
makes a mistake, people’s trust in that system
dramatically decreases. Compared to H-A
interactions, in H-H interactions, it takes longer for
trust to decrease and a shorter time to recover over
the course of a relationship [7]. In both H-H and HA interactions, changes in perceived trustworthiness
might influence self-reported affect.

1.2. Positive and Negative Affect
Emotions are “organized responses, crossing the
boundaries of many psychological subsystems,
including the physiological, cognitive, motivational,
and experiential systems. Emotions typically arise in
response to an event, either internal or external, that
has a positively or negatively valanced meaning for

the individual” [10]. Emotions vary on two
dimensions: arousal and valence. Arousal, or intensity
of the emotion, ranges from low to high. Valence
ranges from positive to negative. Positively valanced
emotions (i.e., positive affect) are described as happy,
enthusiastic, and alert. Examples of negatively
valanced emotions (i.e., negative affect) are anger,
fear, and disgust [11]. People use both affect and
cognition to help interpret situations and aid in
decision-making [12]. For example, if people feel
emotionally connected to robots, their perceived
trustworthiness of the robot may increase [2; 13],
demonstrating that positive affect (PA) may affect
judgments towards robots. Thus, interplay of affect
and trust is an important consideration for trust
research.
1.2.1. Positive Affect and Trust
Researchers have found that participants who
experienced PA (e.g., happiness) rated referents as
more trustworthy compared to participants who
experienced
negative affect (NA), namely anger [14].
Furthermore, affect influenced trust only when
participants rated someone who was unfamiliar to
them, such as an acquaintance compared to a familiar
person. Similarly,
[15] primed participants with PA or NA prior to an
experimental task. They found that participants who
were assigned to the PA condition reported feeling
PA prior to an automated convoy task and reported
higher trust in an automated decision aid during the
task. However, these effects were only demonstrated
in the first session. The subsequent two sessions that
participants completed did not show this effect. It
appears that affect only influences initial trust, or
trust from the most recent transaction. As people
acquire more information about the referent, other
factors become significant predictors of trust other
than affect. Lount [16] reported that when
participants were provided with information on how
trustworthy their partner was via self-report scores in
a trust game, there was an interaction between affect
and how much money the participants sent to their
partners. When participants were in a positive
affective state, they sent more money to trustworthy
partners, compared to participants who experience
neutral affect, in which there were no differences in
how much money they sent to their partners.
These studies demonstrate that PA influences
trust in a relationship when people have little
information about their partners. The current study
investigates a different directional hypothesis—the
role of trust and distrust manipulations on affective
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responses. Though the relationship between trust
and affect has been examined in the
aforementioned research [2; 3; 13; 14; 15; 16], the
current study wishes to narrow focus on the effect of
trust manipulations on affect, and how biases
towards humans and robots affect these
relationships.
1.2.2. Negative Affect and Trust
In our review of the published literature on
emotions and trust in the context of game theory,
anger was the most discussed and prevalent negative
affect emotion. In particular, anger can be triggered
by low offers from the trustor in Trust and Ultimatum
games [17]. Games such as the Trust, Ultimatum, and
Investor/Dictator games are games in which usually
two people exchange money between one another to
study fairness, trust, and self-interest [17]. The first
player (e.g., trustor, prosper, or investor), is given
money from the experimenter at the start of the
session and told he/she can split it with the second
player (e.g., trustee, dictator, or responder).
Depending on the game, the session can last one or
multiple rounds. The trustee can choose to accept the
offer or reject it and the game ends (Ultimatum and
Investor/Dictator game), or the money is tripled each
time it is passed to each player and the players have
the option to stop the game at any point and take the
entire earnings (Trust game). Hewig and colleagues
[18] studied how participants felt after playing both
the Ultimatum and Dictator games. Results indicated
that as unfair offers increased, participants reported
more negative emotions.
Pillutla and Murnighan [19] examined the effect
participants’ anger had on their rejections when their
partner in the Ultimatum game made an unfair offer.
Results indicated that anger and unfairness were
significantly, positively correlated, such that as unfair
offers increased, so did anger. These two studies
examined how NA can influence how participants
behave while playing games designed to study trust.
Anger in particular was positively correlated with
higher rejection rates. One explanation is that
participants felt as though they were being treated
unfairly. However, these studies only compared H-H
dyads and did not examine H-A pairs.
In an effort to study the role of biases in H-H pairs
compared to H-A pairs, researchers compared how
humans
responded
both
behaviorally
and
physiologically when playing the Ultimatum game
with both human and computer partners [20]. When
participants received a low, unfair offer of money
from their partners, participants were more likely to
reject those offers in the H-H condition when

compared to the human-computer condition. Also,
participants had high emotional arousal as measured
by skin conductivity when they were offered low offers
from another human. Conversely, when participants
played with a computer partner, there were no
differences in emotional arousal. These results could
be because people perceived the computer as fair and
thus failed to experience negative emotions. The
current study seeks to investigate these effects over
time. Specifically, we explored the effects of trust
manipulations on affect over time, and how this
relationship is moderated by characteristics of the
partner (human vs automation).

1.3. The Current Study
The aim of the current study is to examine the
change in affect over time in unfamiliar H-H and
human-robot (H-R) interactions. We examined selfreported state affect changes when participants’
partners display trustful and distrustful behaviors.
Before making directional hypotheses, the task should
be explained so there is more context for each
hypothesis.

2. Method
2.1. Participants
Participants were 97 adults recruited from a
Midwestern college. Participants were randomly
distributed among the four experimental conditions:
Trust-Human (n = 23), Distrust-Human (n = 22),
Trust- Robot (n = 25), or Distrust-Robot (n = 27).
Ages ranged from 18-41 years (M = 22.82 years, SD
= 4.68 years). Most (59%) were female and white
(41%). Participants were recruited from the
Introduction to Psychology participant pool, flyers,
email, and word of mouth. Participants received
compensation in the form of a $30 gift card, as well
as cash payment for all money earned during the
task. The study was overseen by the institutional
review board.

2.2. Task
The task played in the current study is called
Checkmate [21]. It is a computer game played
between two players. Checkmate is a modified
version of the investor/dictator game [22]. In the
current study, the participant was assigned the role of
the “Banker” (investor in the investment/dictator
game) and a robot or confederate played the role of
the “Runner” (dictator in the investment/dictator
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game). The role of the Banker was to loan money to
the Runner over the course of five rounds. The role
of the Runner was to collect boxes in a virtual maze
over the course of five rounds. The number of boxes
collected by the Runner reflected performance. The
initial amount of money in the Banker’s virtual
account was set at $50. The Bankers loaned money
to the Runner each round in anticipation of earning
interest on their investment. Each round the Banker
chose to loan one of three amounts to the Runner:
small ($1-$7), medium ($4-$10), or large ($7-$13).
Based on their selections, a pre-determined
algorithm specified the exact dollar amount that
would be sent to the Runner.
The Runner chose a risk level for the purpose
of potentially increasing the initial loan amount.
The risk levels were low (75-150%), moderate (50200%), and high (0-300%). The Runner could earn
more money by choosing a higher risk level, but
the Runner risked not earning any money at all if
his performance was poor. If the Runner decided
to err on the side of caution and chose a low risk
level, the maximum amount of money the Runner
lost was 25% without collecting any boxes or
gained 50% by performing well.
At the beginning of the round, the Runner chose a
risk level. The Runner then promised to return the
initial loan and 50% of the earnings to the Banker.
The Banker was notified via a pop-up message
which risk level the Runner selected, as well as how
much of the invested money the Runner promised to
return. At this point in the round, the Banker
selected an amount to loan to the Runner. Money
was then transferred into the Runner’s virtual wallet.
The maze-running task began, and the Banker was
able to watch a top-down video of the Runner’s
progress. The Runner was allotted two minutes to
collect as many boxes as possible. After the mazerunning task was over, the Runner then decided how
much money to return to the Banker. The Banker
received a pop-up message of the exact amount of
money the Runner decided to return. If the amount
returned was within the range of what the Runner
had promised, then the Banker could assume that
the Runner was trustworthy. However, if the return
amount was lower than promised, then the Banker
might assume that 1) the Runner may have not
earned enough money to return and keep their
promise, or 2) the Runner is playing unfairly by
keeping more money for themselves, which could
signal that the Runner is distrustful.
The steps outlined above were repeated over six
rounds, which we coded as zero to five. Participants
were informed that the amount of money the Banker
had in his/her virtual bank at the end of the session

belonged to the Banker, and the earnings were paid out
in the form of cash, rounded up to the nearest quarter.

2.3. Manipulations
Typically, Checkmate [21] is played between two
people. For this study, the participant was always the
Banker, and the Runner was either a Nao robot (see
Figure 1) or a male confederate. The Runner’s risk
level in the game was set to medium-risk for every
round. All the Runner’s data, including maze
performance and returning of investment to Banker,
was prerecorded. This level of control allowed a focus
on the way that participants trusted their partner.
However, participants were led to believe they were
playing in real time with either the robot or the human.
Additionally, participants were randomly assigned to
one of two experimental conditions: trust or distrust.
In the trust condition, the Runner always returned the
amount of money that was promised for rounds 0-5. In
the distrust condition, the Runner returned less money
than he promised for rounds 3 and 4.

2.4. Measures
2.4.1. Affect.
State affect was measured using the shortened 10item Positive and Negative Affect Schedule
(PANAS; [11]). Participants were instructed to
indicate the extent they felt in the present moment
using a 5-point response scale (1 = very slightly or
not at all, 5 = extremely). Scores were computed by
averaging responses for the positive and negative
affective words separately so that each participant
had an independent average score for both PA and
NA for rounds 0-5.
Positive affect (PA) items included Interested,
Excited, Enthusiastic, Alert, and Determined. Scale
reliabilities are as follows: Round 0 (α = .87); Round
1 (α = .90); Round 2 (α = .88); Round 3 (α = .88);
Round 4 (α = .89); Round 5 (α = .89).
Negative affect (NA) items included Distressed,
Upset, Irritable, Nervous, and Jittery. Scale
reliabilities are as follows: Round 0 (α = .76);
Round 1 (α = .61); Round 2 (α = .71); Round 3 (α =
.72); Round 4 (α = .74); Round 5 (α = .76).
2.4.2. Time.
Time was classified at each round. The practice
round was coded as Time 0 and the five subsequent
rounds were coded as Time 1-5.
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Figure 1. NAO robot; partner in robot
condition.
2.5. Procedure
Participants were run individually in a two-room
laboratory. First, they were introduced to their partner
(robot or confederate). In the robot condition, the
robot was located in the back room of the computer
lab. The participants were told they were going to
meet the other participant for the study, and then
walked into the back room to meet the robot. The
experimenter tapped the robot on the head, which
initiated the following speech and behavior. The
robot stood up and became animated and said the
following,
“Thanks
for
waking
me
up
[experimenter’s name]. Hi, I’m Rufus. It’s nice to
meet you. Time to get to work.” Then the robot
returned to the crouching position. In the human
condition, participants were introduced to each other
once they entered the lab together and then seated in
separate rooms.
After providing informed consent, participants
completed demographic surveys, then completed an
endowment earning task, which consisted of five,
medium-difficulty, multiple choice math problems.
The purpose of this task was to make participants feel
like they earned the money. Because the money in the
task was in a virtual bank, we wanted to make this
connection as salient as possible. Participants were
told that based on their performance they would earn
money towards the main task if they answered at least
three out of five of the questions correctly. However,
all participants earned $50 regardless of their
performance in order to ensure experimental control.
After the math task, in the robot condition, the
experimenter read a backstory on Rufus aloud to
participants, “The military currently integrates
automation into dangerous scenarios alongside
humans. Automation is useful in high-risk scenarios,
such as disabling explosive devices, navigating
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and carrying

heavy equipment. However, automation is expensive
and takes time to develop. As such, the military is
testing automated robots containing self- preservation
algorithms. This means the military is creating robots
that should be able to make decisions to protect
themselves, as well as other humans around them. If a
situation is too dangerous, the robot should take proper
precautions to minimize damages to itself. The current
study uses the same algorithms to aid the robot’s
decision-making when teamed with another human in a
maze-running task. Keep in mind that Rufus the robot
may act self-interested, meaning he may prioritize
himself over you.”
Next, participants completed training on
Checkmate, then played a practice round of
Checkmate with their partner. Participants were told
prior to coming in that they were randomly selected to
play the Banker for the real session of five rounds and
their partner was selected to play the Runner.
Following practice (Time 0), participants completed
the state affect questionnaire. Each round lasted
approximately three to five minutes. Following each
round (Time 1-5), participants were asked to complete
the state affect survey. After the competition of the
fifth round, participants were debriefed and paid for
their time with a $30 gift card. The money in their
virtual wallet was paid to them in cash.

2.6. Research Design and Analysis
We tested changes in self-reported affect over
time across the Condition (Trust vs Distrust) and
Partner (Human vs Robot) factors using growth
curve models
[23] in the nlme package in R [24; 25]. Growth curve
models have benefits over repeated measures
ANOVA (e.g., more relaxed model assumptions,
ability to handle missing data, ability to model
individual growth patterns). In general, there are two
levels to growth models. Level-1 variables
correspond to time-level variables (e.g., time, timevariant covariates), whereas Level-2 variables occur
at the person level (e.g., time- invariant covariates).
In the current models, we denoted three random
effects (i.e., intercept variance, a quadratic time term
variance, and a cubic time term variance). Random
slope variance (i.e., random quadratic and cubic
effects) allow each person to have his or her unique
growth estimate. Then, we predicted that individual
growth curve with person-level variables (i.e.,
partner type and condition).
Overall, we expected a linear change over time
for the trust condition and a cubic change over time
for the distrust condition. In general, polynomial
terms model deviations from the typical linear
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regression. The number of “bends” modeled in the
growth curve can be calculated by subtracting one
from the polynomial term. For example, a cubic
term allows the slope to bend twice. In the distrust
condition specifically, we expected that PA would
increase for the first three rounds, decrease after the
two distrust behaviors, and then increase after the
final trust behavior (i.e., a cubic slope). We expected
the opposite pattern for the NA model (i.e., an initial
decrease in NA, a sharp increase in NA following
the two distrust behaviors, and finally a decrease in
NA after the final trusting behavior). We also
predicted that NA would rise steeper following a
distrust behavior when the partner type was human,
given that people ascribe their feelings of anger and
spite to humans more than automation [20]. Thus,
our hypotheses are as follows:

PA across the first three trials (Time 0-2), supporting
Hypothesis 1. Participants assigned to the distrust
condition showed a significant decrease in PA
following the distrust behaviors, and then a significant
increase in PA following the final trust behavior (see
Figure 2). Hypothesis 2 was supported. We also found
evidence of auto-correlated errors, ∆ꭓ2(1)= 11.37, p <
.01, so we included this term in the model. This
accounts for the measurement errors of proximal time
points having stronger correlations with each other
than measurements more distally spaced in time. We
found no evidence of violation of the homoscedasticity
assumption, so we excluded it from the model. We
found no significant differences in quadratic or cubic
time between partner types (see Table 1). Hypotheses
3 and 4 were not supported.

RQ: Are there differences in PA and NA for partner
type for Time 0-2?
H1: In both conditions, PA will increase for
Time 0-2.
H2: In the distrust condition, PA will decrease for
Time 3 and Time 4, and increase in Time 5.
H3: In the distrust condition, PA will decrease
more over time when the partner is a human
compared to a robot.
H4: In the distrust condition, PA will be higher
for robot than human
H5: In both conditions, NA will decrease for
Time 0-2.
H6: In the distrust condition, NA will increase
for Time 3 and Time 4, and decrease in Time 5.
H7: In the distrust condition, NA will increase
more if the partner is a human compared to a robot.
H8: In the distrust condition, NA will be higher
for human than robot.

3. Results
3.1. Positive Affect
First, we determined whether the intraclass
correlation (ICC) was large enough to allow each
person to have a unique initial PA score. We found an
ICC score of .64, which supports a free intercept
model (i.e., allowing each participant to have a unique
starting PA score). We observed significant estimates
for time (B = 0.46, t(473) = 5.67, p < .01), the
quadratic term for the distrust condition (B = -0.09,
t(473) = -2.98, p < .01), and the cubic term for the
distrust condition (B = 0.01, t(473) = 2.49, p < .05).
Stated simply, participants across both trust and
distrust conditions showed a significant increase in

Figure 2. Change in positive affect over time in
the distrust condition (top) and the trust
condition.
3.2. Negative Affect
We followed the same steps for testing differences
in NA as described in the PA section above. We
observed an intraclass correlation (ICC) of .55, so we
allowed the intercepts to vary across people. We
observed a significant estimate for time (B = -0.62,
t(473) = -8.57, p < .01), a significant quadratic term
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for the distrust condition (B = 0.13, t(473) = 4.48, p <
.01), and a significant cubic term for the distrust
condition (B = - 0.02, t(473) = -4.14, p < .01).
Participants across both conditions showed a decrease
in NA across the first three trials. Hypothesis 5 was
supported. Then, those assigned to the distrust
condition showed a significant increase in NA
following the distrust behaviors, and a significant
decrease in NA following the final trust behavior (see
Figure 3). Hypothesis 6 was supported. We found
evidence of violation to the assumption of
homoscedasticity of the errors, ∆ꭓ2(1) = 9.18, p < .01, so
we included this term in the model [23]. We observed no
significant differences in human and robot partners on
decreases in NA across the first three time points. In the
distrust condition, the increase in NA after the distrust
behaviors was stronger for the robot condition, γ = 0.12,
t(468) = 2.03, p < .05. Thus, Hypothesis 7 was not supported.
The decrease in NA following the final trust behavior was
also steeper for the robot partner type, γ =-0.02, t(468) = 2.21, p < .05. Hypothesis 8 was not supported. Note that
these findings were the opposite of the predicted
pattern.

Figure 3. Change in NA over time in the
distrust condition (top) and the trust condition
(bottom).

Table 1
Positive Affect Changes Over Time
(Intercept)
Time
Time2
Time3
Partner
Trust
Time:Partner
Time2:Trust
Partner:Time2
Partner:Trust
Trust: Time3
Partner: Time3
Partner:Time2:Trust
Partner:Trust: Time3

Estimate

SE

df

t-value

p-value

3.42
0.61
-0.24
0.03
0.24
0.21
-0.29
-0.12
0.14
-0.56
0.02
-0.02
0.04
-0.01

0.20
0.12
0.07
0.01
0.27
0.27
0.17
0.05
0.09
0.37
0.01
0.01
0.06
0.01

468
468
468
468
93
93
468
468
468
93
468
468
468
468

17.48
4.95
-3.59
2.87
0.88
0.75
-1.73
-2.49
1.58
-1.49
2.25
-1.33
0.55
-0.67

.00
.00
.00
.00
.38
.45
.09
.01
.12
.14
.02
.19
.58
.51

Note. Time = linear change. Time2 = quadratic change. Time3 = cubic change. Partner = Human vs. Robot.
Robot was the reference group. Trust = Distrust was the reference group.
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Table 2
Negative Affect Changes Over Time

(Intercept)
Time
Time2
Time3
Partner
Trust
Time:Partner
Time2:Trust
Partner:Time2
Partner:Trust
Trust: Time3
Partner: Time3
Partner:Time2:Trust
Partner:Trust: Time3

Estimate

SE

2.25
-0.62
0.24
-0.03
-0.26
-0.23
-0.01
0.08
-0.04
-0.01
-0.01
0.01
0.12
-0.02

0.13
0.11
0.06
0.01
0.18
0.18
0.16
0.04
0.08
0.24
0.01
0.01
0.06
0.01

df
468.00
468.00
468.00
468.00
93.00
93.00
468.00
468.00
468.00
93.00
468.00
468.00
468.00
468.00

t-value

p-value

16.99
-5.39
4.01
-3.55
-1.42
-1.31
-0.07
1.83
-0.47
-0.04
-1.52
0.80
2.03
-2.21

.00
.00
.00
.00
.16
.19
.94
.07
.64
.96
.13
.42
.04
.03

Note. Time = linear change. Time2 = quadratic change. Time3 = cubic change. Partner = Human vs. Robot.
Robot was the reference group. Trust = Distrust was the reference group.

4. Discussion
Overall, we expected participants to report increased
PA, and decreased NA, when participants experienced
a trust behavior. Additionally, we predicted that when
participants were paired with a human partner,
participants would have steeper changes in affect
following a distrust behavior compared to a robot
partner. As hypothesized, we found that PA had a
linear relationship with time, such that PA increased
for the first three time points in both conditions,
regardless of partner type. Just as PA increased for
the first three rounds in both conditions, NA
decreased for Time 0-2, demonstrating an expected
negative relationship between PA and NA. This is
understandable, as the first three time points were all
trust behaviors. For Time 3 and Time 4 in the distrust
condition, PA decreased and NA increased when the
participants received less money back than promised
from their partners. During the final round (Time 5),
when the partner once again returned the amount of
money that was promised, PA increased and NA
decreased. However, contrary to our hypotheses, the
change in PA in the distrust condition, depending on
partner type, was non-significant. There were no
differences in PA when participants’ partner was a
human or a robot. There was a significant change in
NA in the distrust condition, although it was in the
opposite direction we hypothesized. Specifically, NA
increased more when the partner was a robot
compared to a human, and PA was higher when
partner type was a human compared to a robot. These
results contradict what past researchers have found
[20]. One reason for this could be that the type of
automation that used was a computer [20], and we

used a robot. As automation becomes more
anthropomorphized, people ascribe more human-like
qualities to the referent [6, 26]. As such, people may
attribute will and autonomy to robots more than they
do computers. Additionally, these differences may have
been due to differences in the task. Future research
should compare various types of automation to a
human partner in a variety of tasks to examine the
effects of anthropomorphism on affect.
Pulling from the social science literature, another
reason that these results could have occurred is due to
person-positivity bias [27]. This means that people
generally believe the best in people and are optimistic
about others’ intentions. Similarly, the mere-exposure
effect [28], sometimes referred to as the familiarity
principle, posits that people rate others and objects more
positively when they are familiar with them. In this
study, the partner type was either a human or a robot. As
the participants were human, they were more familiar
with the human partner compared to a robot partner.
Therefore, one reason that the participants experienced
less PA and more NA when their partner was a robot is
because, presumably, they have had limited exposure to
anthropomorphized robots.
Finally, the current findings align with prior
research on automation bias [8; 29]. If participants
perceived the robot partner as being perfectly
reliable, they may have experienced increased NA
following a distrust behavior due to violations of this
heuristic. It is noteworthy, however, that NA
decreased more for the robot partner compared to the
human partner for the trust behavior following the
distrust behaviors. We would expect that violations
to the perfect automation schema would result in a
slower decrease in NA in trust recovery compared to
a human partner.
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A limitation of this study, however, was that it
only contained a total of six measurement time
points. In order to gain a better understanding of
how trust behaviors influence affect over time, more
instances of trust and distrust should be included.
Specifically, we may have observed a different
pattern in affect amongst the trust recovery process
with more time points included after time point four.
However, to our knowledge, this is one of the few
studies that has measured affect over several time
points, whereas most studies are cross-sectional.
Another limitation of the current study is the
sample size. Although researchers are unsure of the
exact sample size required for growth curve models
[30], a larger sample size may be needed given our
limited number of measurements and the cubic
nature of the change for those assigned to the
distrust conditions. We should note, however, that
the number of longitudinal studies on comparing HH and H-R trust has been minimal.
A third limitation concerns our sample of
participants. This was a convenience sample of
mostly college students from a Midwestern
university. Previous researchers have demonstrated
that while recruiting participants using various
methods such as crowd- soured websites like
Amazon Mechanical Turk or social media postings
on platforms such as Twitter or Reddit result in
more diverse samples compared to college student
samples, results from an in-lab behavioral study with
college students had almost identical results when it
was adapted for a computer and administered online
to participants from crowd-sourced and social media
outlets [31]. However, our research may not
generalize to H-R teams using people in HRI in the
real world.
We used a shortened version of the PANAS [11],
and some items may have been ambiguous in the
current context. For example, some item stems (e.g.,
Distressed, Nervous, Jittery in the NA scale; Excited,
Enthusiastic within the PA scale) may have been
inappropriate for this context, because the task itself
did not lend itself to evoke these emotions. Future
research may benefit from using all 20 items or
selecting affect items that are more likely to be
experienced during the task.
Finally, we omitted the relationship between
affect and actual participant behavior. The statistical
models used in the current study were complex, and
analyses on categorical behavioral outcomes only
add to the complexity. Moreover, the addition of
these analyses were outside the scope of this study
which focused on the effects of a trust manipulation
on affect. Given the practical significance of the
effects of PA and NA on perception and behaviors

[32]; future research should examine behaviors when
comparing affective outcomes across human and
robot partners.
This study demonstrated the influence of trust and
distrust behaviors on affect over time. This research
is important because affect is essential to judgement,
decision-making, and reasoning [33]. The
implications for this research concern the affective
responses that are attributed to trust manipulations.
Contrary to our hypotheses, trust violations led to
increased NA responses when the human was
partnered with a robot. We postulate this may be due
to more severe decay of trust when an automated aid
fails to perform as expected [7], and this in turn may
lead to a negative affective response. Note, however,
that this increase in NA may be beneficial, as prior
research has found that NA has related to higher
attention to specific details (e.g., [34]). However,
violations to the perfect automation schema may lead
to automation disuse [9]. Future work may consider
these affective responses differing between humans
and robots. When training teams comprising humans
and automated assistants, researchers should note
that a loss of trust between each referent may lead to
different affective responses, and this trajectory may
vary over time and have differing consequences for
team-based tasks.
This research demonstrated that when robot
partners engage in distrust behaviors, humans
experience more NA compared to human partners.
When users experience NA, they may be less likely to
interact with robots. Designers should increase
transparency and make sure that users understand the
capabilities of the robot in order to reduce instances of
NA and promote successful interactions.
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